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ABSTRACT
The traditional wisdom holds that the benefits of a decentralized channel structure arise from 
downstream competitive relationships. In contrast, Arya and Mittendorf (2007) showed that 
the value of decentralization can also arise from upstream interaction when the downstream 
firm conveys internal strife (decentralization) to an upstream external supplier. This paper 
extends the single firm centralization-decentralization choice model of Arya and Mittendorf 
(2007) to a strategic choice model in which all downstream competitors play a strategic 
centralization-decentralization game. We demonstrate that whether the main conclusions in the 
context of non-strategic choice of channel structure continue to hold when all firms play a 
centralization-decentralization game depends critically on the market structure of the upstream 
input market. Specifically, the conclusions are valid if all firms have exclusive upstream input 
suppliers but not so if the upstream input market is monopolized. Thus, whether the value of 
decentralization can arise from upstream interaction depends critically on the market structure 
of the upstream market.
JEL Codes: L22, D21
Keywords: Strategic Choice, Channel Structure, Oligopoly
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1. Introduction
Arya and Mittendorf (2007) offered a new point about the benefit of decentralization that internal 
inefficiency caused by transfer pricing associated with decentralization can force a firm’s external input 
supplier to lower its supplier price to the extent that the decrease in input price overcomes the internal strife 
created by decentralization so that the firm ends up earning greater profits. This result is obtained in the 
context with the following three important assumptions. First, only one firm (in focus) chooses between 
centralization and decentralization while all of this firm’s product-market competitors are assumed to be 
centralized. Second, the firm in question plays a strategic sequential-move game with its external input 
supplier while all of its competitors’ external suppliers are assumed to be non-strategic. More specifically, the 
firm in focus chooses between centralization and decentralization and its external supplier sets a supplier price 
in anticipation of the firm’s choice of distribution channel (centralization or decentralization). All other firms 
compete in the product market with the firm in focus but they are all centralized and they procure their external 
input from their supplier(s) at a price that is equal to the (constant) unit production cost.1
The point made by Arya and Mittendorf is important and represents a significant advancement in our 
understanding of the mode of distribution channels. Like prices and quantities, internal channel structures are 
certainly deliberate choices that firms make. Accordingly, one natural area of inquiry along this line of 
research opened up by Arya and Mittenford lends to the following three questions: Do all competitors have an 
incentive to decentralize? Will the insights in a single firm choice model continue to be valid if all competitors 
engage in a choice on their channel structure and will strategic supplier price play a role? Does the market 
structure of the upstream market influence the value of decentralization arising from the upstream interaction?
In this paper, we would like to explore the mode of distribution channels under a more general market structure 
by relaxing the three assumptions by Arya and Mittendorf (2007).
Third, each firm is 
assumed to procure an external input from its exclusive supplier.
As all firms (the firm in focus and its rivals) become strategic in the choice of their internal channel 
                                                          
1
Equivalently, all other competitors are centralized and produce all inputs internally.
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structure, the merit of decentralization becomes less intuitive. This is because when the rivals of the focal firm
can choose decentralization the supplier of the focal firm might not want to cut into its supplier price as much 
as in the situation where all rivals of the focal firm are centralized as in Arya and Mittenford (2007). In other 
words, the supplier knows that the rivals of its downstream firm have an option to be decentralized and thus 
may compete less aggressively. Hence, it is not clear whether the value of decentralization can arise from 
upstream interaction when all firms convey internal strife (decentralization) to their upstream external 
suppliers. The answer to this question is puzzling as the rival’s external supplier sets a supplier price in 
anticipation of the rival’s choice of distribution channel (centralization or decentralization). That is the 
situation where all firms’ external suppliers select their supplier prices strategically. It is because compared to 
the situation where the rival’s supplier sets supply price to the (constant) unit production cost, the supplier of 
the firm in focus might be more reluctant to cut into its supply price if it knows the supplier of the rival can 
choose supply price above the production cost thus the downstream competition is even less competitive. In
addition, the answer to the puzzle becomes even less intuitive as firms share a common supplier. It is because 
the common supplier has even less incentive to reduce the supplier price to the firm in focus which chooses 
decentralization as the supplier has alternative demand from downstream. The present paper sets out to explore 
the answers to this puzzle by extending the single firm centralization-decentralization choice model of Arya 
and Mittendorf (2007) to a strategic choice model in which all downstream competitors play a strategic 
centralization-decentralization game.
The questions posted above are obviously very closely linked and their answers could be sought in a 
single unified model. We will make the choice of distribution channel strategic in the sense that all final goods 
competitors make a choice on their distribution channel (centralized or decentralized). Moreover, all firms’ 
external suppliers select their supplier prices strategically. As a result, the whole game involves three stages of 
strategic choices. In the first stage, all firms play a simultaneous move game in choosing between 
centralization and decentralization. In the second stage, supplier price(s) and internal transfer prices are chosen 
simultaneously. In the third stage, outputs for the final products are chosen simultaneously. As in Arya and 
Mittendorf (2007), the final stage may be either in a quantity game or a price game. In terms of the whole 
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game being played, the key addition in our study here is the stage one game. We shall call the reduced game 
for stage one the centralization-decentralization game. As a contrast, we shall refer to the choice of 
centralization and decentralization in the model of Arya and Mittendorf (2007) as non-strategic in the sense 
that the firm in focus alone is contemplating a choice between centralization and decentralization.
In studying our centralization-decentralization game, we naturally do away with Arya and Mittendorf’s 
assumption that all other final-good producers procure their external input at the constant unit cost of 
production. Instead, we assume all external suppliers play similar roles and choose their supplier prices
strategically. In our base model of two firms (Section 2) it is assumed that the two final-good producers have 
different exclusive external suppliers. The main result we obtain from this setting is that the superiority of 
decentralization over centralization in the non-strategic choice model of Arya and Mittendorf (2007) continues 
to hold true in the strategic choice situation. Specifically, we show that choosing decentralization is a dominant 
strategy for both firms. Moreover, the decentralization outcome is superior to the centralization outcome for 
both firms; i.e., the two firms do better when both choose decentralization than when both choose 
centralization.
However, interestingly, we show that this conclusion can get reversed as firms share a common 
supplier. In other words, whether the value of decentralization can arise from upstream interaction depends 
critically on the market structure of the upstream market. Specifically, we consider a market structure in the 
upstream external input market that is the polar opposite to that in the base model. The second exploration area
of the present paper (Sections 4 and 5) is on an important variation of our base model when the two firms share 
a common external input supplier. Obviously, such a supplier has more power over the downstream firms. It 
turns out that in this variation the result for the base model is substantially altered. We show that the 
decentralization outcome is no longer an equilibrium except for the case when goods are distant substitutes. 
For moderate or close substitutes, centralization is the only equilibrium outcome. Although the decentralization 
outcome is superior to the centralization outcome in that both firms reap higher profits when they are 
decentralized to force a collectively strong hand on the monopoly input supplier, such an outcome is not 
possible as the result of strategic choices when firms follow their own best interest. 
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Returning to our base model, the main reason that decentralization is a dominant strategy for both 
firms rests in the effects on input prices decentralization can have. As in the non-strategic choice situation of 
Arya and Mittendorf (2007), when a firm switches from centralization to decentralization it forces its external 
supplier to lower its supplier price for fear of large drops in demand due to internal strife created by 
decentralization of the downstream firm. In the strategic choice situation of our base model, a switch from 
centralization to decentralization by one firm has this effect as well plus the additional effect that it induces the 
external supplier of the firm’s product market competitor to raise its supplier price.2
Section 3 of the paper extends the base model of two firms to one with any fixed number of firms. The 
same intuitions continue to apply and the same results are shown to hold provided that goods are not close 
substitutes. This extends a similar result in Arya and Mittendorf (2007) to the strategic choice setting. In 
appendix B, we further show that the results of our base model continue to hold if the two firms compete via 
Bertrand price competition as opposed to Cournot quantity competition assumed in our base model.
Both effects on external
input prices work to provide a firm with incentives to switch from centralization to decentralization. Moreover, 
these effects are the same in direction regardless of the distribution channel structure (centralized or 
decentralized) of the competitor, making decentralization dominant strategies in the centralization-
decentralization game. 
The main reason for the common supplier model (Sections 4 and 5) to yield different results from the 
base model is that the aforementioned two effects on external input prices no longer work in the same 
direction. In the common supplier model, when a firm switches from centralization to decentralization the 
supplier price still decreases as in the base model. However, the supplier price for the firm’s competitor also 
                                                          
2
When a firm switches from centralization to decentralization, it becomes relatively less efficient in the sense that its 
internal transfer price is higher than the marginal cost of production for the internally produced input. This puts its lower 
division at a disadvantage in its competition with the centralized firm in the product markets since its cost from the 
internal input becomes higher relative to the centralized firm. This change in cost lowers the switching firm’s demand for 
the input produced by its external supplier but raises the demand for the centralized firm which in turn raises the 
centralized firm’s demand for the input of its external supplier. With linear demand curves, the switching firm’s external 
supplier faces a more elastic demand while the competitor’s external supplier faces a less elastic demand, resulting in a 
lower external input price for the switching firm and a higher external input price for the firm staying put.
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decreases.
3
The issue of centralization versus decentralization has been a topic of study by researchers for decades. 
Dating back to Spengler (1950), researchers have long been interested in the comparison between centralized 
and decentralized distribution channels. McGuire and Staelin (1983) and Coughlan (1985) studied a
manufacturer’s choice on the structure of distribution channels. They showed that a decentralized channel such 
as selling through a middleman is more profitable for the manufacturer if products are close substitutes,
whereas a centralized channel is more attractive for distant substitutes. Rey and Stiglitz (1995) found that 
manufacturers might use exclusive territories to reduce competition and decentralized channel is valuable as 
the channel competition is excessive. Gupta and Loulou (1998) demonstrated that decentralized channels 
might be more profitable for close substitutes when process innovation is taken into account. Trivedi (1998) 
extended the literature by analyzing a market structure with channel competition at both manufacturer and 
retailer levels and showed that manufacturers can no longer use decentralized channel as a cushion against 
competition. Deviating from the aforementioned papers which focus exclusively on price competition, Wang, 
Chen and Wu (2010) studied the implication as manufacturers are engaged in advertising competition. They 
found that a decentralized channel might benefit a manufacturer if it chooses to advertise and the rival chooses 
not to advertise. Most of the existing literature concludes that the benefits of a decentralized channel arise from 
downstream competition. As elaborated above, the present paper is most closely related to the work of Arya 
and Mittendorf (2007). Their study and our research look at the potential benefit decentralization can bring in 
the context of upstream connections. 
These two effects provide opposite incentives for the firm contemplating a switch. Moreover, the 
second effect provides an incentive for the firm’s competitor to free ride by staying with centralization so as to 
enjoy the fruit of the former’s action in receiving a lower external input price while retaining an advantage at 
the same time over the former by avoiding internal strife. As a result, centralization becomes a dominant 
strategy as long as the goods are moderate or close substitutes. 
                                                          
3
In the non-uniform pricing version of the model (Section 5), the second effect is present when the competitor is 
decentralized but disappears when the competitor is centralized. It results in asymmetrical equilibrium choices in the 
centralization-decentralization game.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our base model with two firms 
producing two substituting goods and each having an exclusive external supplier. In Section 3, we extend the 
base model to one with any fixed number of firms producing substituting goods and each having an exclusive 
external supplier. In Section 4, we examine a variation of our base model in which the external input is 
monopolized and produced by a common supplier with uniform price. In Section 5, we relax the uniform price 
assumption in Section 4 by allowing the common external supplier to charge non-uniform prices to the two 
downstream firms. Section 6 concludes the paper. The paper has two appendices. Appendix A contains 
lemmas and proofs of some of the results in the paper. Appendix B is concerned with the base model but 
assumes that the two firms engage in Bertrand price competition in the final stage of the game. 
2. The Base Model: Two Firms with Exclusive External Suppliers
The base model we consider has two firms (labeled as firm 1 and firm 2). The two firms face
symmetric linear (inverse) demands, !" = # $ %" $ &%'", ( = 1,2, where !" and %" are the price and quantity of 
firm i’s final product, # gauges the maximum (non-negative) price consumers are willing to pay for either 
good, and & ) [0,1] measures the level of substitutability between the two products. The two goods are 
independent if & = 0, and are perfect substitutes if & = 1. The cost of production is also symmetric between 
the two firms. One unit of output needs one unit of an internally manufactured input at a constant unit cost *+,
and one unit of an externally manufactured input at a price set by the external supplier. The two firms have
different exclusive external suppliers. (In Sections 4 and 5 we study a variation from the base model in which 
the firms have a common external supplier.) The external suppliers produce at the same constant unit cost *,.
It is assumed that *, + *+ < #.
Each firm chooses its structure of distribution channel – either a centralized channel or a decentralized 
channel.
4
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For a decentralized firm, the lower division serves as the distributor of its final product. 
For a centralized firm, it procures the external input from its external supplier and internalizes the 
cost of production of the internal input to maximize its total profit. For a decentralized firm, it splits up into an 
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upper division and a lower division. The upper division produces the internal input and supplies it to the lower 
division at a transfer price. The lower division uses both the external input from the firm’s external supplier 
and the internal input from the upper division to produce the final product. The lower division has zero 
additional cost. Each division maximizes its divisional profit. The profit of the firm is the total profit of the two 
divisions.5
The two firms compete in the product market. In the base model (this section) they choose outputs via
Cournot competition. For each firm, this decision is made by the firm if it chooses a centralized distribution 
channel; otherwise, the decision is made by the lower division of the firm. In Appendix B, we will report the 
results for the base model but assume that the firms engage in Bertrand price competition in the product 
market.
There are three stages in the game. In stage one, the two firms simultaneously decide on centralization 
or decentralization. In stage two, supplier prices and transfer prices for a decentralized firm are determined. In 
stage three, outputs are chosen by the centralized firm or by the lower division of a decentralized firm. We 
solve the game backward and hence the solution concept is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
The first stage of the game described above has four possible outcomes corresponding to four 
subgames: both firms choose centralization (CC), both choose decentralization (DD), firm 1 chooses
decentralization and firm 2 chooses centralization (DC), and firm 1 chooses centralization and firm 2 chooses
decentralization (CD). These four subgames are analyzed and the corresponding results are presented in
Lemma 1 to Lemma 4 in Appendix A.
Anticipating the equilibria in the four subgames as summarized in Lemmas 1-4, the two firms play a 
distribution channel game on centralization vs. decentralization in stage one of the three-stage game. We shall 
call the reduced game at stage one the centralization-decentralization game. The following proposition
summarizes our findings about this game.
                                                          
5
We follow the treatment of Arya and Mittendorf (2007). The lower division is not an independent middleman because its 
profit belongs to the firm. This setup is different from those in Coughlan (1985) and McGuire and Staelin (1983).
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Proposition 1. With two firms each having an exclusive external supplier, the following results hold for the 
centralization-decentralization game.
(1) Decentralization is the dominant strategy for both firms for all & ) [0,1].
(2) The game is an efficient dominant-strategy game.
Proof:  In Appendix A.
In the context of non-strategic choice between centralization and decentralization by a single firm,
Arya and Mittendorf (2007) put forth the essential intuition that internal strife can create a wedge so that a 
firm’s external supplier is forced to lower its supplier price in such a way that the downstream firm improves 
its profit relative to centralization. Proposition 1 establishes that this conclusion continues to hold in the 
strategic choice situation when there are two downstream firms both of which have their own exclusive 
external supplier and both choose between centralization and decentralization. Moreover, the equilibrium is 
efficient for the downstream firms in that both firms do better when both choose decentralization than when 
both choose centralization. 
3.  N Firms with Exclusive External Suppliers
In this section, we extend the base model studied in the previous section to one with - (- > 2) firms.
As in the base model, each of the - firms has an exclusive external supplier. The linear (inverse) demand 
function for firm ( is given by 
!" = # $ %" $ &. %//0" ,     0 1 & 1 1, ( = 1,2, … ,-.
Assume that 2 of the - firms choose to be centralized and the remaining - $2 firms choose to be 
decentralized. (This is a typical subgame in stage one of the three-stage game.) The external suppliers 
maximize their individual profit in choosing their supplier prices. The centralized firms and the lower divisions
of the decentralized firms maximize profit by choosing quantities. Close examinations of the equilibrium input 
prices by the external suppliers, presented in Lemma 5 in Appendix A, lead to the following conclusions about 
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these prices.
Corollary 1. (1) If a centralized firm switches to decentralization, its own supplier price decreases while all 
other firms’ supplier prices increase. That is,
34'5,6'4758 > 34,6'49 , 34'5,6'4759 > 34,6'49 , and 34'5,6'4758 > 34,6'48 .
(2) The supplier price for each centralized firm is greater than that of all decentralized firms. That is,
34,6'49 > 34,6'48 .
Proof:  In Appendix A.
Part (1) of this corollary establishes that, no matter how many other firms are centralized, a centralized 
firm is able to lower the input price charged by its exclusive external supplier by switching to decentralization. 
This action at the same time raises the input prices of all other firms (centralized and decentralized) from their 
external suppliers. Part (2) of the corollary shows that centralized firms always have higher prices from their 
external suppliers than decentralized firms do.
The profit expressions in Lemma 5 imply that the number of centralized firms affects the profits of 
both types of firms proportionally. More specifically, the ratio of a centralized firm’s profit over a 
decentralized firm’s profit is independent of the number of centralized firms (2). This fact helps to establish 
the following result about the profits for the two types of firms.
Corollary 2. With any number of centralized firms, in equilibrium every decentralized firm makes a larger 
profit than all centralized firms provided that & 1 3/4.
Proof:  In Appendix A.
These two corollaries point to an incentive for a centralized firm to switch to decentralization. Our 
next main result (Proposition 2) shows that is indeed the case provided that goods are not close substitutes.
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When a firm switches from centralization to decentralization, it joins the ranks of a group of decentralized 
firms, all of which enjoy a cost advantage in the price of the external input but suffer from internal strife 
caused by decentralization. This is advantageous except in the case of close substitutes in which internal strife 
and fierce competition may eat away the advantage gained from a lower input price.
Proposition 2. With - firms each having an exclusive external supplier, the following results hold for the 
centralization-decentralization game provided that & 1 3/4.
(1) Decentralization is the dominant strategy for all firms.
(2) The game is an efficient dominant-strategy game.
Proof:  In Appendix A.
This proposition extends the results in Proposition 1 for two firms to the general case of - firms. It 
shows that the results for the case of two firms continue to hold for any number of firms provided that the 
goods are not close substitutes (& 1 3/4).6 Proposition 2 also generalizes a corresponding result in the case of 
non-strategic choice of distribution channel obtained by Arya and Mittendorf (2007).
7
4. Common External Supplier with Uniform Pricing
In this section we consider an important variation from the base model by assuming that the two firms 
share a common external supplier. We have seen that with exclusive external suppliers, firms can weaken the 
pricing power of their suppliers and the cost position of their competitors by switching from centralization to 
decentralization. Here we examine how these powers are affected when the external input is monopolized. In 
this section we shall assume that the external supplier has to charge a uniform price to the two downstream 
firms regardless of what mode of distribution channel each adopts. In the next section, we examine the 
                                                          
6
It may be worthwhile to point out that the condition on the substitution parameter & is not a necessary condition in that 
for larger values of & the equilibrium may be the same (although other outcomes may be supported in equilibrium).
7
 Note that the condition on the substitution parameter & in Proposition 2 is the same as that in Corollary 1 of Arya and 
Mittendorf (2007). 
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common external supplier model by allowing the external supplier to charge possibly different prices to the 
two downstream firms. While the results are somewhat different from the one with uniform pricing, the 
essential conclusion established below that the existence of a common external supplier substantially alters a 
firm’s incentive to become decentralized remains valid.
Like in the base model, the game here is played in three stages and there are four possible outcomes 
following stage one. We present results in Lemma 6 to Lemma 9 for the four subgames in Appendix A.
From Lemmas 6-9, we have the following relationships among the input prices set by the common 
external supplier for the two downstream firms under different distribution channel structures:
399 $ 398 = (:';)(<'=>'=?):(5@7;) > 0, 3
89 $ 398 = 0, 398 $ 388 = AB':;';
CD(<'=>'=?)
(E';)(5@7;) > 0.
Hence, the supplier price is the highest when both firms are centralized and the lowest when both firms are 
decentralized.
It follows from the above that when a firm switches from centralization to decentralization, the 
supplier price by the external supplier becomes lower regardless of the choice of distribution mode by the other 
firm. That is, switching from centralization to decentralization always lowers the input price charged by the 
external supplier. The crucial difference between the situation here and that when firms have different external 
suppliers is that the benefit of a lowered supplier price is reaped by both firms. With a common external
supplier, switching to decentralization by a firm does not raise the supplier price of its competitor but rather 
lowers it as well. As a result, if one firm chooses to be decentralized the other firm has an incentive to free ride 
by choosing to be centralized. By doing so, the latter reaps the benefit of a lower input price from the external 
supplier while still enjoys an advantage over its competitor by avoiding internal strife. This makes 
decentralization to be chosen only when the goods are distant substitutes (weak competition).
The next proposition shows the main result of this section. 
Proposition 3. With the two firms sharing a common external supplier that charges a uniform price, the 
following results hold for the centralization-decentralization game. 
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(1) If 0.3708 < !"! 1, then both firms have a dominant strategy C and the game is a prisoner’s dilemma game.
(2) If 0 1 & 1 0.3708, then there are two Nash equilibria: (C, C) and (D, D).
Part (1) of this proposition confirms the intuition stated above that the incentive to free ride renders 
decentralization an inferior choice. However, both firms choosing decentralization is superior to both choosing 
centralization. That makes the game a prisoner’s game, provided that the goods are moderate or close 
substitutes (0.3708 < & 1 1). When the goods are distant substitutes (& 1 0.3708), the benefit from free 
riding is small due to the reduced benefit one enjoys from having a cost advantage over its competitor. In this 
case, equilibrium is attained as long as both firms make the same choice of distribution channel.
Proposition 3 shows that the result in the base model that (D, D) is a dominant-strategy equilibrium is 
no longer valid when the firms share a common external supplier. This is due to the crucial differences in the 
effects of one’s switching from centralization to decentralization on its own supplier price and on its rival’s 
supplier price under the two scenarios. It follows that whether a firm should adopt a decentralized distribution 
channel depends on whether such choice is a strategic variable as part of a game played between rival firms 
and also on the market environment the rivals are in (such as having exclusive external suppliers or sharing a 
common external supplier). In other words, whether the value of decentralization can arise from upstream 
interaction depends critically on the market structure of the upstream market.
The free ride due to the uniform price from the common external supplier renders decentralization an 
inferior option. The next section relaxes the uniform price assumption and shows that decentralization could 
still be a worse option under some condition.
5. Common External Supplier with Non-uniform Pricing
In this section, we analyze a variation of the common external supplier model studied in section 4. In 
section 4, the external supplier is bound to set a uniform price for the two downstream firms. Here the supplier 
may charge non-uniform supplier prices to the two firms. Following a similar framework, the two firms choose 
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to be centralized or decentralized in a three-stage game. We present the results for the four second-stage 
subgames by Lemma 10-13 in Appendix A.
Based on Lemmas 10-13, we can make the following statements about changes in input prices by the 
external supplier. Holding firm 2 as a centralized firm, if firm 1 switches from centralization to 
decentralization its external input price changes by
3589 $ 3599 = $
(2$ &)(# $ *+ $ *,)
12
< 0;
whereas firm 2’s external input price stays unchanged as 3:89 $ 3:99 = 0. This points to an advantage firm 1 
can gain by switching to decentralization if firm 2 is centralized. Holding firm 2 as a decentralized firm, if firm 
1 switches from centralization to decentralization its external input price changes by
3588 $ 3598 = $
(2$ &)(# $ *+ $ *,)
2(6$ &) < 0;
while firm 2’s external input price changes by
3588 $ 3598 = $
&(2$ &)(# $ *+ $ *,)
12(6$ &) < 0.
In this case firm 1’s switching from centralization to decentralization lowers the input prices charged to both 
firms. This result points to a lack of incentive to switch from centralization to decentralization when the rival 
firm is decentralized.
The above discussions indicate that when the common external supplier may charge different prices to 
the two downstream firms the centralization-decentralization game is likely to result in asymmetric choices in 
equilibrium. The next proposition confirms this result by showing that the game has two equilibria both 
involving asymmetric choices of distribution channel by the two firms. 
Proposition 4. With the two firms sharing a common external supplier that may charge different prices, the 
following results hold for the centralization-decentralization game. 
(1) There are two Nash equilibria: (C, D) and (D, C).
(2) Neither firm has a dominant strategy.
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When the two downstream firms have to rely on a common supplier who can charge different prices to 
them, decentralization is no longer a dominant strategy for either firm as in the case of uniform pricing 
(Proposition 3). This is because the incentive of the common supplier to cut into its prices is weakened due to 
the alternative demand sources. In other words, relying on a common suppler exacerbates competition between 
the two firms and excessive competition makes less favorable supplier terms. Interestingly, in contrast to 
Proposition 3, centralization is not a dominant strategy for either firm under non-uniform pricing. This is due 
to that non-uniform pricing by the input supplier removes the free-ride incentive for the downstream firms.
Thus, the disadvantage of decentralization in this section is not driven by the free-rider issue present under 
uniform supply pricing. Rather, it is driven by the other firm’s choice and the common external supplier setup.
Specifically, if one firm chooses to be centralized, the other firm would choose decentralization because the 
benefit from the cut of supplier price still outweighs the cost even though the supplier term is less favorable. If 
one firm chooses to be decentralized, the other firm would choose the centralization strategy. This is because 
the decentralization choice for the latter is not beneficial as an effective means to further cut supplier prices.
The benefit gleaned from decentralization is muted and becomes less attractive for this firm than the value
brought by centralization which avoids internal strife.
Propositions 3 and 4 together show that monopolization of the upstream market weakens each
downstream firm’s benefit from decentralization. Thus, whether the value of decentralization can arise from 
upstream interaction depends critically on the market structure of the upstream market. The finding provides 
an interesting boundary for the novel result of benefit of decentralization proposed by Arya and Mittendorf 
(2007). This paper offers important managerial implications to managers when they procure external input 
from external suppliers by suggesting the need to more comprehensively understand the upstream market 
structure before they make the decision about the mode of distribution channel.
6. Concluding Remarks
We have shown that when two firms with exclusive external input suppliers are engaged in the 
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strategic choice to be centralized or decentralized, the preference for decentralization persists as in the study by
Arya and Mittendorf (2007). The equilibrium is Pareto efficient as the concessions in supplier prices offered by 
both firms’ external suppliers overwhelm the internal strife (inefficiency) associated with decentralization. The 
conclusion holds both when the firms compete in quantities and in prices in the final goods markets. The 
conclusion also holds true with any fixed number of firms when every firm has an exclusive external input 
supplier provided that goods are not very close substitutes. 
However, we have also shown that the validity of the above conclusion depends critically on the nature 
of competition in the upstream input market. In particular, if there is a single external input supplier (or 
equivalently the upstream input market is a collusive) then the above conclusion no longer holds. This is true 
both when the common external supplier charges a uniform price and when it practices price discrimination. 
The topic of centralized or decentralized distribution channel deserves much future research. An
extension of the framework of Arya and Mittendorf (2007) and this paper might integrate consumer search by 
considering a situation where manufacturers have to sell various products through a platform where they have 
to pay the platform slotting fees to be located at the prominent place. 8
Following most of the existing literature, this paper assumes the manufacturer to be the architect of the 
channel. A second interesting avenue to explore might be to consider the situation where the retailer can also 
influence the channel structure. There are a lot of examples in marketing that the retailer owns the retail space 
and can therefore decide whether to purchase from the manufacturer at a wholesale price and then resell the 
goods, or allow the manufacturer to set up a store-within-a-store. In the latter situation, the manufacturer
decides the retail price. Jerath and Zhang (2010) conduct pioneer research on the issue of store-within-a-store
Under an optimal stopping rule, 
consumers search these prominent stores first and then decide whether to search the non-prominent ones.
Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou (2009) show that prominence introduces asymmetry retail demand and prices
among competing firms. Thus, it might be interesting to know how the asymmetry in retail level competition
influences manufacturer’s choice on the structure of distribution channel.
                                                          
8
In Macy or Bloomingdale, one can observe a number of department stores. The stores located near the entrance or other 
prominent positions might catch consumer’s attention first. 
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and find that the retailer tends to choose the stores-within-a-store arrangement for distant substitutes. Thus, 
according to our paper, the decentralized manufacturer is more likely to set up a store-within-a-store while the 
retailer would purchase from the centralized manufacturer and resell the products within its store. Under this 
expectation, it might be harder for the decentralized manufacturer to convince its supplier to cut into supplier
price thus a decentralized manufacturer might not be profitable at all. By integrating the retailer’s choice, the 
framework might allow us to examine the channel structure that emerges when the retailer and manufacturers
can both make choices on the structure of the distribution channels.
Another interesting topic is to consider the situation where manufactures can strategically choose to be 
prominent or not within a platform. The non-prominent one conveys weakness to its supplier and attempts to 
obtain favorable supply terms. Knowing that consumers might not search these non-prominent manufacturers,
the supplier might have to lower its supplier price. As a result, the non-prominent locations might not be a 
curse but become a blessing for manufacturers. 
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Appendix A:  Lemmas and Proofs
In this appendix we present our analyses of the subgames for the base model and its extension and 
variations, as well as proofs of propositions and corollaries. Our presentation follows the same order as the 
sections in the text.
Two Firms with Exclusive External Suppliers:
Centralization subgame CC
In this subgame, the two exclusive external suppliers first simultaneously set their supplier prices s1
and s2, respectively. Given the supplier prices, the two firms then simultaneously choose their retail outputs q1
and q2, respectively, to maximize their individual profit as follows:
:
%5(35, 3:) = #FG2#HIJ(!5 $ 35 $ *+)%5 (1)
%:(35, 3:) = #FG2#HIC(!: $ 3: $ *+)%: (2) 
Solving (1) and (2) jointly, we obtain the firms’ retail output quantities given the supplier prices. 
In stage 2 of the game, the two exclusive suppliers decide the supplier prices to maximize their 
individual profits and solve:
35 = #FG2#HKJ(35 $ *,)%5(35, 3:) (3)
3: = #FG2#HKC(3: $ *,)%:(35, 3:) (4)
The solution to (3) and (4) yields the equilibrium supplier prices. Substituting these values back into (1) and 
(2) gives the firms’ equilibrium quantities. The corresponding equilibrium prices as well as profits can be 
obtained from the demand functions. The results are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1: In the equilibrium for subgame CC,
1) supplier prices are
3599 = 3:99 =
(:';)(<'=?)7:=>
@'; ;
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2) retail prices and quantities are
!599 = !:99 =
AE';CD<7:(57;)(=>7=?)
(:7;)(@';) , %5
99 = %:99 = :(<'=>'=?)(:7;)(@';);
3) firm profits are 
L599 = A!599 $ 3599 $ *+D%599 = @(<'=>'=?)
C
(:7;)C(@';)C, L:
99 = A!:99 $ 3:99 $ *+D%:99 = @(<'=>'=?)
C
(:7;)C(@';)C.
As expected, when both firms adopt a centralized distribution channel the solution is symmetric. 
Moreover, the supplier prices are above marginal costs (*,). 
Decentralization subgame DD
In the subgame DD, the suppliers and both firms’ upper divisions first simultaneously set the supplier
prices s1 and s2 and transfer prices t1 and t2, respectively. Then, the two lower divisions simultaneously choose 
their outputs q1 and q2 to maximize their division profit:
:
%5(35, 3:, M5, M:) = #FG2#HIJ(!5 $ 35 $ M5)%5 (5)
%:(35, 3:, M5, M:) = #FG2#HIC(!: $ 3: $ M:)%: (6)
Anticipating the lower divisions’ behaviors as described by (5) and (6), the two exclusive suppliers decide s1
and s2 and the upper divisions of the two firms set t1 and t2, respectively, to maximize their individual profits as 
follows:
35 = #FG2#HKJ(35 $ *,)%5(35, 3:, M5, M:) (7)
3: = #FG2#HKC(3: $ *,)%:(35, 3:, M5, M:) (8)
M5 = #FG2#HNJ(M5 $ *+)%5(35, 3:, M5, M:) (9)
M: = #FG2#HNC(M: $ *+)%:(35, 3:, M5, M:) (10)
The solution to (7) - (10) leads to the equilibrium supplier prices and transfer prices. Substituting these values 
back into (5) and (6) yields the firms’ equilibrium quantities, equilibrium retail prices and equilibrium profits 
for the two firms. These results are presented in Lemma 2.
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Lemma 2: In the equilibrium for subgame DD,
1) supplier prices are
3588 = 3:88 =
(:';)(<'=?)7(@';)=>
:(O';) ;
2) transfer prices, retail prices and quantities are
M588 = M:88 =
(:';)(<'=>)7(@';)=?
:(O';) ,
!588 = !:88 = A
P';CD<7(57;)(=>7=?)
(:7;)(O';) ,
%588 = %:88 = <'=>'=?(:7;)(O';);
3) firms’ profits are
9
L588 = (!588 $ 3588 $ *+)%588 = (E';
C)(<'=>'=?)C
:(:7;)C(O';)C ,
L:88 = (!:88 $ 3:88 $ *+)%:88 = (E';
C)(<'=>'=?)C
:(:7;)C(O';)C .
As expected, when both firms adopt a decentralized distribution channel the solution is symmetric. 
Moreover, both the supplier prices and the transfer prices are above the respective marginal costs (*, and *+).
Subgame with firm 1 decentralized and firm 2 centralized (DC)
In this subgame, first the external suppliers set their supplier prices s1 and s2, and simultaneously firm
1’s upper division decides the transfer price t1. Then, the lower division of firm 1 and firm 2 simultaneously 
choose outputs q1 and q2 to solve the following problems:
:
%5(35, 3:, M5) = #FG2#HIJ(!5 $ 35 $ M5)%5 (11)
%:(35, 3:, M5) = #FG2#HIC(!: $ 3: $ *+)%: (12)
Anticipating the behaviors as described in (11) and (12), supplier 1 and supplier 2 choose s1 and s2,
                                                          
9
The profit of a decentralized firm is the sum of the profit of its two divisions. 
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respectively, and firm 1’s upper division selects transfer price t1, to maximize their individual profits as 
follows:
35 = #FG2#HKJ(35 $ *,)%5(35, 3:, M5) (13)
3: = #FG2#HKC(3: $ *,)%:(35, 3:, M5) (14)
M5 = #FG2#HNJ(M5 $ *+)%5(35, 3:, M5) (15)
Solving (13) - (15) jointly, we obtain the equilibrium supplier prices and transfer price. Substituting these 
values into (11) and (12) yields the firms’ equilibrium quantities as well as the equilibrium prices and profits 
from demand functions. 
Lemma 3. In the equilibrium for subgame DC,
1) supplier prices are
3589 =
(:'Q)(@7;)(<'=?)7(5E7:;';C)=>
:(5:';C) , 3:
89 =
(:';)(O7;)(<'=?)7(E7;)=>
5:';C ;
2) transfer price in firm 1, retail prices and quantities are
M589 =
(:'Q)(@7;)(<'=>)7(5E7:;';C)=?
:(5:';C) ,
!589 =
A@7;)(P';CD<7A@7R;7:;CD(=>7=?)
(:7;)(5:';C) , !:
89 =
AO7;)(E';CD<7AE7E;7;CD(=>7=?)
(:7;)(5:';C) ,
%589 =
(@7;)(<'=>'=?)
(:7;)(5:';C) , %:
89 = :
(O7;)(<'=>'=?)
(:7;)(5:';C) ;
3) firm profits are
L589 = A!589 $ 3589 $ *+D%589 = (@7;)
C(E';C)(<'=>'=?)C
:(:7;)C(5:';C)C ,
L:89 = A!:89 $ 3:89 $ *+D%:89 = @(O7;)
C(<'=>'=?)C
(:7;)C(5:';C)C .
Both firms’ suppliers charge above their marginal cost. Firm 1’s transfer price is above the marginal 
cost of the internally produced input. As expected, the solution for this subgame is asymmetric. 
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Subgame with firm 1 centralized and firm 2 decentralized (CD)
Results for subgame CD are immediately obtainable from Lemma 3 by switching the positions 
between the two firms. Thus we have 
:
Lemma 4. In the equilibrium for subgame CD,
3) supplier prices are
3598 =
(:';)(O7;)(<'=?)7(E7;)=>
5:';C ,  3:
98 =
(:'Q)(@7;)(<'=?)7(5E7:;';C)=>
:(5:';C) ;
4) transfer price in firm 2, retail prices and quantities are
M:98 =
(:'Q)(@7;)(<'=>)7(5E7:;';C)=?
:(5:';C) ,
!598 =
AO7;)(E';CD<7AE7E;7;CD(=>7=?)
(:7;)(5:';C) , !:
98 =
A@7;)(P';CD<7A@7R;7:;CD(=>7=?)
(:7;)(5:';C) ,
%598 = :
(O7;)(<'=>'=?)
(:7;)(5:';C) , %:
98 =
(@7;)(<'=>'=?)
(:7;)(5:';C) ;
3) firm profits are
L598 = A!598 $ 3598 $ *+D%598 = @(O7;)
C(<'=>'=?)C
(:7;)C(5:';C)C ,
L:98 = A!:98 $ 3:98 $ *+D%:98 = (@7;)
C(E';C)(<'=>'=?)C
:(:7;)C(5:';C)C .
Proof of Proposition 1:
The centralization-decentralization game is represented by the following game matrix:
Firm 2
 C D 
C (L599, L:99) (L598, L:98) 
D (L589, L:89) (L588, L:88) 
Consider first that firm 2 is centralized (first column of the above matrix). If firm 1 switches from 
centralization to decentralization, by Lemmas 1 and 3, the change in price from its supplier is 
Firm 1
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3589 $ 3599 =
$(2$ &)(8$ &:)(# $ *+) $ (32$ 2& $ 3&:)*,
2(4$ &)(12$ &:) < 0.
Meanwhile, the supplier price of firm 2 is also affected and changes by 
3:89 $ 3:99 =
&(2$ &)(# $ *, $ *+)
(4$ &)(12$ &:) > 0.
Hence, when firm 1 switches from centralization to decentralization while firm 2 stays centralized, the former 
will receive a lower price from its external supplier while the other firm will see the price from its external 
supplier raised.
10
Now suppose firm 2 is decentralized (second column of the above matrix). If firm 1 switches from 
centralization to decentralization, by Lemmas 2 and 4, the change in price from its supplier is
3588 $ 3598 =
$(2$ &)(6$ &:)(# $ *+)$ (32$ 2& $ 3&:)*,
2(3$ &)(12$ &:) < 0.
These effects combine to increase the profit of firm 1 as confirmed by
L589 $ L599 =
(2$ &)(12 + 6& $ 6&: + &O)
2(2 + &):(3$ &):(4$ &): (# $ *, $ *+)
: > 0.
Meanwhile, the supplier price of firm 2 is also affected and changes by 
3:88 $ 3:98 =
&(2$ &)(# $ *, $ *+)
2(3$ &)(12$ &:) > 0.
Hence, when firm 1 switches from centralization to decentralization while firm 2 stays decentralized, the 
former will receive a lower price from its external supplier while the other firm will see the price from its 
external supplier raised.
11
                                                          
10
An explanation of these changes in supplier prices can be obtained by looking at the changes in the elasticities of the 
derived demands the two external input suppliers face. By comparing the solutions for (%5, %:) for (1) and (2) and for (11)
and (12), we find that when firm 1 switches from centralization to decentralization and firm 2 stays centralized the 
demand for firm 1’s external input supplier changes by 2(*+ $ M5)/(4 $ &:) while demand for firm 2’s external input 
supplier changes by &(M5 $ *+)/(4 $ &:); the former change is negative while the latter change is positive. These changes 
represent a parallel downward shift in the demand for firm 1’s external input supplier and a parallel upward shift in the 
demand for firm 2’s external input supplier. As a result, the demand for firm 1’s external input supplier becomes more 
elastic while the demand for firm 2’s external input supplier becomes less elastic. Corresponding, in equilibrium, firm 1’s 
external input supplier lowers its price while firm 2’s raises its price.
These effects combine to increase the profit of the first firm as confirmed by
11
A similar explanation exists as in the case when firm 2 stays centralized. More specifically, by comparing the solutions
for (%5, %:) for (5) and (6) and for the corresponding two problems (not provided in the text) in subgame CD, we find that 
when firm 1 switches from centralization to decentralization while firm 2 stays decentralized the demand for firm 1’s 
external input supplier changes by 2(*+ $ M5)/(4 $ &:) < 0 while demand for firm 2’s external input supplier changes by 
2(M5 $ *+)/(4 $ &:) > 0. These changes make the demand for firm 1’s external input supplier more elastic and the 
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L588 $ L598 =
216$ 144&: + 22&@ $ &E
2(2 + &):(3$ &):(12$ &:): (# $ *, $ *+)
: > 0.
The above discussions stipulate that, for each firm, decentralization is better than centralization given 
either mode of distribution channel by the other firm. Hence, decentralization is a dominant strategy for both 
firms in the centralization-decentralization game. 
Moreover, from Lemmas 1 and 2, the difference between the supplier prices under centralization and 
decentralization for both firms (( = 1,2) is 
3"99 $ 3"88 =
(2 $ &):(# $ *, $ *+)
2(3$ &)(4$ &) > 0.
It follows both external suppliers charge a lower price when both downstream firms are decentralized than 
when both are centralized. This is directly responsible for the result that both downstream firms (( = 1,2) earn 
a higher profit when both choose decentralization as opposed to when both choose centralization, as shown by
L"88 $ L"99 =
(:';)(5:7E;'E;C7;S)
:(:7;)C(O';)C(@';)C (# $ *, $ *+)
: > 0, for ( = 1,2.
Hence, it is a dominant strategy for both firms to choose decentralization. That is, the unique Nash 
equilibrium of the centralization-decentralization game is (D, D). Moreover, the equilibrium is Pareto efficient. 
The game is therefore an efficient dominant-strategy game.
12
N Firms with Exclusive External Suppliers:
We solve the three-stage game backward. In stage 3, centralized firms (( = 1, … ,2) and the lower 
divisions of decentralized firms (T = 2 + 1, … ,-) choose their outputs simultaneously to solve the following 
problems:
%" = #FG2#HIU(!" $ 3" $ *+)%" (16)
%/ = #FG2#HIV(!/ $ 3/ $ M/)%/, (17)
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
demand for firm 2’s external input supplier less elastic, resulting in firm 1’s external input supplier lowering its price and
firm 2’s external input supplier raising its price.
12
 Wang and Yang (2003) provide a classification of 2 × 2 games. 
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where M/ denotes the transfer price in decentralized firm T. In stage 2, external suppliers (( = 1, … ,2; T = 2 +
1, … ,-) choose their supplier prices and the upper divisions of decentralized firms (T = 2 + 1, … ,-) choose 
their transfer prices to solve the following problems:
3" = #FG2#HKU(3" $ *,)%"(3", 3/, M/) (18)
3/ = #FG2#HKVA3/ $ *,D%/(3", 3/, M/) (19)
M/ = #FG2#HNVAM/ $ *+D%/(3", 3/, M/) (20)
The solutions of (18) to (20) yield the equilibrium supplier prices and transfer prices. Substituting these values 
back into (16) and (17), we obtain the firms’ equilibrium quantities, and then the equilibrium prices and profits 
from the demand functions. The next lemma presents these values.
Lemma 5.
13
1) the supplier price for each centralized firm is
With 2 centralized firms, - $2 decentralized firms and each having an exclusive external 
supplier, in equilibrium
34,6'49 = A5:'5@;7E6;7@;
C'O6;CD(<'=?)7(5:':W;7:4;75W6;7B;C':4;C'B6;C746;C7:6;C)=>
:@'O@;7:4;75E6;75:;C':4;C'556;C746;C7:6C;C ;
2) the supplier price for each decentralized firm is
34,6'48 = AB'5W;7@6;7O;
C':6;CD(<'=?)7(5E':@;7:4;75:6;7X;C':4;C'X6;C746;C7:6;C)=>
:@'O@;7:4;75E6;75:;C':4;C'556;C746;C7:6C;C ;
3) each centralized firm’s profit is 
L4,6'49 = (:':;76;)
C(E'@;7O6;)C(<'=>'=?)C
(:';76;)C(:@'O@;7:4;75E6;75:;C':4;C'556;C746;C7:6C;C)C;
4) each decentralized firm’s profit is
L4,6'48 =
(:':;76;)(@'O;7:6;)C(E'E;7O6;7;C'6;C)(<'=>'=?)C
(:';76;)C(:@'O@;7:4;75E6;75:;C':4;C'556;C746;C7:6C;C)C.
                                                          
13
 Due to their messy expressions and not being explicitly used in our discussions below, we do not present the 
equilibrium retail prices and quantities. 
25 
 
Proof of Corollary 1:
If a centralized firm switches to decentralization, its supplier price will change by (assuming all other 
firms stay the same in their choice of distribution channel)
34'5,6'4758 $ 34,6'49 =
'(:';)(<'=?'=>)[@B7@(475@6':E);7:AOX'O4'@:67:4675W6CD;C7(':W7:47OO6'O46746C'5E6C7:6S);S]
[:@'O@;7:(4'5);75E6;75:;C':(4'5);C'556;C7(4'5)6;C7:6C;C](:@'O@;7:4;75E6;75:;C':4;C'556;C746;C7:6C;C)
The sign of this difference is opposite of the bracketed terms in the numerator above. Among the four terms in 
the bracketed expression in the numerator above, the second term is always positive, the third term is negative 
only when n = 2 with the lowest value at -5; the last term is negative only for n from 2 to 5 with the lowest 
value at -16. Since the first term (48) is greater than all the possible negative values added, the entire 
expression is always positive. Hence, 34'5,6'4758 > 34,6'49 . This proves the first statement in part (1) of 
Corollary 1. 
Treating m as a continuous variable and differentiating the expression for 34,6'4= in part (1) of Lemma 
5 with respect to m, we have
YKZ,[\Z]
Y4 = $
;(:':;76;)A5:'5@;7E6;7@;C'O6;CD(<'=?'=>)
(:@'O@;7:4;75E6;75:;C':4;C'556;C746;C7:6C;C)C < 0.
Since the above holds for all m, it follows that 34'5,6'4759 > 34,6'49 . Similarly, differentiating the expression 
for 34,6'48 in part (2) of Lemma 5 yields
YKZ,[\Z^
Y4 = $
;(:':;76;)AB'5W;7@6;7O;C':6;CD(<'=?'=>)
(:@'O@;7:4;75E6;75:;C':4;C'556;C746;C7:6C;C)C < 0.
It follows that 34'5,6'4758 > 34,6'48 . That completes the proof for part (1) of Corollary 1.
Applying Lemma 5, the difference between the supplier price for each centralized firm and that for 
each decentralized firms is
34,6'49 $ 34,6'48 =
(:';)(:7(6'5);)(<'=?'=>)
:@'O@;7:4;75E6;75:;C':4;C'556;C746;C7:6C;C > 0.
This implies that given any number of centralized firms (2), each decentralized firm receives a lower price 
from its external supplier than every centralized firm. Hence, part (2) of Corollary 1 is proved.
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Proof of Corollary 2:
From the expressions for L4,6'4= and L4,6'48 in parts (3) and (4) of Lemma 5, we have14
_Z,[\Z`
_Z,[\Z^
=
(:':;76;)(E'@;7O6;)C
(E'E;7O6;7;C'6;C)(@'O;7:6;)C. 
Denote this ratio by G(-, &). For & = 0, G(-, &) = 3/4 for all n, implying that L4,6'4= < L4,6'48 for all m
and n if & = 0. The proposition is therefore proven if we can show that L4,6'4= < L4,6'48 holds true for all 
0 < & 1 3/4, all - a 2 and all 2 1 -. We prove this by showing that G(-, &) < 1 for all 0 < & 1 3/4 and all 
- a 2.
We first show that G(-, &) is strictly increasing in n for all & ) (0,1]. Treating n as a continuous 
variable and taking derivative of G(-, &) with respect to n, we obtain this derivative as given by
(E'@;7O6;);C[:@7@(E6'55);7EAP'P676CD;C'(B'5567@6C);³]
(E'E;7O6;7;C'6;C)C(@'O;7:6;)S .
The sign of this expression is obviously the same as the sign of 
24 + 4(6- $ 11)& + 6(5$ 5- + -:)&: $ (8$ 11- + 4-:)&³.
Since 6- $ 11 > 0 for - a 2, we have, for all & ) (0,1],
24 + 4(6- $ 11)& + 6(5$ 5- + -:)&: $ (8$ 11- + 4-:)&O
> 24&: + 4(6- $ 11)&: + 6(5$ 5- + -:)&: $ (8$ 11- + 4-:)&O
= (10$ 6- + 6-²)&: $ (8$ 11- + 4-:)&O = (2 + 5- + 2-²)&: + (8$ 11- + 4-:)(&: $ &O)
a (2 + 5- + 2-:)&: > 0,
where the second to last inequality uses the fact that 8 $ 11- + 4-: > 0 for all - a 1. It follows that G(-, &)
is strictly increasing in n for all & ) (0,1].
It is straightforward to verify that lim6bc G(-, &) = X@(O';). Combining the fact this limit is less than 
or equal to 1 if and only if & 1 3/4 with the established results above, we can conclude that G(-, &) < 1 for all 
- a 2 and all & 1 3/4. This completes the proof for Corollary 2.
                                                          
14
Note that the profit ratio does not depend on the number of centralized firms, m.
27 
 
Proof of Proposition 2:
For the first part of the proposition, we need to prove that given any fixed number of other firms 
adopting centralization, decentralization is more profitable than centralization for each firm. Suppose m-1
other firms are centralized. If a firm chooses centralization then its profit is L4,6'4= ; if it chooses 
decentralization then its profit is L4'5,6'4758 . The ratio of these profits is
L4,6'4=
L4'5,6'4758
=
L4,6'4=
L4,6'48
L4,6'48
L4'5,6'4758
= G(-, &) L4,6'4
8
L4'5,6'4758
,
where the last equation uses the definition of G(-, &) in the proof of Corollary 2. From the expression for 
L4,6'48 in Lemma 5, it is easy to see that L4,6'48 decreases in m. Hence L4,6'48 < L4'5,6'4758 , implying 
that the ratio in the last term above is less than 1. From the proof of Corollary 2, if & 1 3/4 then G(-, &) < 1.
Thus, if & 1 3/4 then _Z,[\Z
`
_Z\J,[\ZdJ^
< 1 . Obviously this result holds for all m. Hence, L4,6'4= <
L4'5,6'4758  for all m. That is, for each firm, decentralization strictly dominates centralization. 
If all firms adopt centralization the profit of each firm is L6,W= ; if all firms adopt decentralization the 
profit of each firm is LW,68 . The fact (used above) that L4,6'48 decreases in m implies that LW,68 > L4,6'48 for 
any positive m. From the expression for L4,6'49 in Lemma 5, it is easy to see that L4,6'49 also decreases in m. 
Hence, L6,W= < L4,6'49 for all m < n. It follows that
_[,e`
_e,[^
<
_Z,[\Z`
_Z,[\Z^
.
By Corollary 2, the right hand side above is less than 1 provided that & 1 3/4. Hence, L6,W= < LW,68 if & 1 3/4.
Hence, the dominant-strategy equilibrium in part (1) yields an outcome that is superior to the outcome in 
which all firms adopt centralization. This proves part (2) of Proposition 2.
Common External Supplier with Uniform Pricing:
Centralization subgame CC
In this subgame, the common external supplier chooses its input price s in stage 2. Given the supplier’s 
price, the two firms then simultaneously choose their outputs %5 and %: in stage 3 to solve the following 
:
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problems:
%5(3) = #FG2#HIJ(!5 $ 3 $ *+)%5 (21)
%:(3) = #FG2#HIC(!: $ 3 $ *+)%: (22)
The solution from (21) and (22) yields the firms’ retail quantities as functions of the supplier price. 
Anticipating the behaviors of the downstream firms as described by (21) and (22), the external supplier 
chooses its supplier price as follows:
3 = #FG2#HK[(3 $ *,)%5(3) + (3 $ *,)%:(3)] (23)
Substituting the solution to (23) back into the quantity functions (21) and (22) yields the equilibrium output 
levels. The results are presented in the next lemma.
Lemma 6. In the equilibrium of subgame CC,15
1) supplier price is
399 = <'=?7=>: ;
2) retail prices and quantities are
!599 = !:99 =
(O7;)<7(57;)(=>7=?)
:(:7;) ,
%599 = %:99 = <'=>'=?:(:7;) ;
3) firm profits are
L599 = A!599 $ 3599 $ *+D%599 = (<'=>'=?)
C
@(:7;)C ,
L:99 = A!:99 $ 3:99 $ *+D%:99 = (<'=>'=?)
C
@(:7;)C .
Comparing with the corresponding subgame when firms have exclusive external suppliers (Lemma 1), 
here the input price charged by the external supplier is higher and the downstream firms earn smaller profits. 
Obviously, both results are intuitive and are direct consequences of monopoly of the external input by a single 
                                                          
15
To avoid cumbersome notation, we use the same superscripts to denote equilibrium values for subgames in different 
sections. Given that these values are mainly used within each section, such use will hopefully not cause much confusion.
29 
 
supplier. 
Decentralization subgame DD
In this subgame, the common external supplier and the two firms’ upper divisions simultaneously 
choose the supplier price s and the transfer prices M5 and M:, respectively, in stage 2. The lower divisions then 
choose their outputs %5 and %: in state 3 to solve the following problems:
:
%5(3, M5, M:) = #FG2#HIJ(!5 $ 3 $ M5)%5 (24)
%:(3, M5, M:) = #FG2#HIC(!: $ 3 $ M:)%: (25)
Anticipating behaviors described by the above functions, the external supplier sets its supplier price (3) and the 
upper divisions of the two firms choose M5 and M:, respectively, to solve the following problems:
3 = #FG2#HK[(3 $ *,)%5(3, M5, M:) + (3 $ *,)%:(3, M5, M:)] (26)
M5 = #FG2#HNJ(M5 $ *+)%5(3, M5, M:) (27)
M: = #FG2#HNC(M: $ *+)%:(3, M5, M:) (28)
Substituting these values back into the quantity functions (24) and (25) yields the firms’ equilibrium retail 
quantities, transfer prices, supplier price and the profits. These results are presented in the next lemma.
Lemma 7. In the equilibrium of subgame DD,
1) supplier price is
388 = :(<'=?)7(@';)=>E'; ;
2) transfer prices, retail prices and quantities are
M588 = M:88 =
(:';)<7@=?'(:';)=>
E'; ,
!588 = !:88 = A
5W7:;';CD<7:(57;)(=>7=?)
(:7;)(E';) ,
%588 = %:88 = :(<'=>'=?)(:7;)(E';);
3) firm profits are
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L588 = (!588 $ 388 $ *+)%588 = :(E';
C)(<'=>'=?)C
(:7;)C(E';)C ,
L:88 = (!:88 $ 388 $ *+)%:88 = :(E';
C)(<'=>'=?)C
(:7;)C(E';)C .
Comparing with the corresponding subgame when firms have exclusive external suppliers (Lemma 2), 
here the input price charged is higher and the downstream firms earn smaller profits. These are direct 
consequences of the monopoly of the external input. Note that the transfer prices become lower as both firms’ 
upper divisions have to cut transfer prices to stimulate demand from the lower divisions.
Subgame with firm 1 decentralized and firm 2 centralized (DC)
In stage 2, the common external supplier chooses its input price s and firm 1’s upper division chooses
transfer price M5. Given these prices, firm 1 and the lower division of firm 2 in stage 3 choose their outputs %5
and %: simultaneously to solve the following problems:
:
%5(3, M5) = #FG2#HIJ(!5 $ 3 $ *+)%5 (29)
%:(3, M5) = #FG2#HIC(!: $ 3 $ M5)%: (30)
Anticipating the behaviors as described by (29) to (30), the external supplier chooses 3 and firm 1’s upper 
division chooses M5 to solve the following problems:
3 = #FG2#HK[(3 $ *,)%5(3, M5) + (3 $ *,)%:(3, M5)] (31)
M5 = #FG2#HNJ(M5 $ *+)%5(3, M5) (32)
Solving (31) to (32) jointly, we obtain the equilibrium supplier price and transfer price. Substituting them back 
into the quantity functions (29) and (30) yields the firms’ equilibrium results in subgame DC.
Lemma 8. In the equilibrium of subgame DC,
1) supplier price is
389 = (E7;)(<'=?)7B=>5@7; ;
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2) transfer price in firm 1, retail prices and quantities are
M589 = :
(:';)(<'=>)7(5W7O;)=?
5@7; ,
!589 =
A:@7B;';CD<7:A:7@;7;CD(=>7=?)
(:7;)(5@7;) ,  !:
89 =
A:W75W;7;CD<7:(@7O;)(=>7=?)
(:7;)(5@7;) ,
%589 = @(<'=>'=?)(:7;)(5@7;), %:
89 = :
(@7;)(<'=>'=?)
(:7;)(5@7;) ;
3) firm profits are
L589 = A!589 $ 389 $ *+D%589 = B(E';
C)(<'=>'=?)C
(:7;)C(5@7;)C , 
L:89 = A!:89 $ 389 $ *+D%:89 = @(@7;)
C(<'=>'=?)C
(:7;)C(5@7;)C . 
Here the supplier price and retail prices are higher than those in the exclusive external supplier case 
(Lemma 3). On the other hand, firms’ profits, transfer price and retail quantities are lower.
Subgame with firm 1 centralized and firm 2 decentralized (CD)
Results for subgame CD are immediately obtainable from Lemma 8 by switching the positions 
between the two firms. Thus we have
:
Lemma 9. In the equilibrium of subgame CD,
1) supplier price is
398 = (E7;)(<'=?)7B=>5@7; ;
2) transfer price in firm 2, retail prices and quantities are
M:98 = :
(:';)(<'=>)7(5W7O;)=?
5@7; ,
!598 =
A:W75W;7;CD<7:(@7O;)(=>7=?)
(:7;)(5@7;) , !:
98 =
A:@7B;';CD<7:A:7@;7;CD(=>7=?)
(:7;)(5@7;) ,
%598 = :
(@7;)(<'=>'=?)
(:7;)(5@7;) , %:
98 = @
(<'=>'=?)
(:7;)(5@7;);
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3) firm profits are
L598 = A!598 $ 398 $ *+D%598 = @(@7;)
C(<'=>'=?)C
(:7;)C(5@7;)C , 
L:98 = A!:98 $ 398 $ *+D%:98 = B(E';
C)(<'=>'=?)C
(:7;)C(5@7;)C . 
Proof of Proposition 3:
From Lemmas 6-9,
L589 $ L599 = f
BAE';CD
(:7;)C(5@7;)C $
5
@(:7;)Cg (# $ *, $ *+)
: < 0, and
L588 $ L598 = [ :(E';
C)
(:7;)C(E';)C $
@(@7;)C
(:7;)C(5@7;)C](# $ *, $ *+)
:.
For 0 1 & 1 0.3708, we have L588 $ L598 > 0. For 0.3708 < & 1 1, we have L588 $ L598 < 0. Thus, if 
0 1 & 1 0.3708 there are two Nash equilibria: (C, C) and (D, D); if 0.3708 < & 1 1, both firms have a 
dominant strategy in C. Since 
L588 $ L599 = L:88 $ L:99 = O
(:';)(:7O;)
@(:7;)C(E';)C (# $ *, $ *+)
: > 0,
the game is a prisoner’s dilemma game for 0.3708 < & 1 1.
Common External Supplier with Non-uniform Pricing:
Centralization subgame CC
In this subgame, the common external supplier sets its input prices s1 and s2 in stage 2. Given the 
supplier’s prices, the two firms simultaneously choose their outputs q1 and q2 in stage 3 to solve the following 
problems:
:
%5(35, 3:) = #FG2#HIJ(!5 $ 35 $ *+)%5
%:(35, 3:) = #FG2#HIC(!: $ 3: $ *+)%:
The solution yields the firms’ retail quantities as functions of the prices 35 and 3:. Anticipating the behaviors 
of the downstream firms, the common supplier decides the supplier prices as follows:
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{35, 3:} = #FG2#HKJ,KC[(35 $ *,)%5(35, 3:) + (3: $ *,)%:(35, 3:)]
Substituting the solution values back into the quantity functions yields the firms’ equilibrium quantities. 
Lemma 10. The equilibrium of the subgame CC here is the same as in Lemma 6.
Decentralization subgame DD
In this subgame, the common supplier and the two firms’ upper divisions simultaneously set the 
supplier prices s1 and s2 and the transfer prices t1 and t2, respectively, in stage 2. The lower divisions then 
choose outputs q1 and q2 in stage 3 to play the following quantity game:
:
%5(35, 3:, M5, M:) = #FG2#HIJ(!5 $ 35 $ M5)%5
%:(35, 3:, M5, M:) = #FG2#HIC(!: $ 3: $ M:)%:
Anticipating such behaviors, the common supplier sets s1 and s2, and the upper divisions of the two firms 
choose t1 and t2, respectively, to solve the following problems:
{35, 3:} = #FG2#HKJ,KC[(35 $ *,)%5(35, 3:, M5, M:) + (3: $ *,)%:(35, 3:, M5, M:)]
M5 = #FG2#HNJ(M5 $ *+)%5(35, 3:, M5, M:)
M: = #FG2#HNC(M: $ *+)%:(35, 3:, M5, M:)
The equilibrium supplier prices and transfer prices can be obtained from solving these problems jointly. 
Plugging the solution values back into the quantity functions above yields the firms’ equilibrium retail 
quantities, transfer prices, supplier prices and the profits.
Lemma 11. The equilibrium of the subgame DD here is the same as in Lemma 7.
Subgame with firm 1 decentralized and firm 2 centralized (DC)
In stage 2, the common supplier sets its input prices s1 and s2, and firm 1’s upper division chooses the 
transfer price t1. Given those input prices, the lower division of firm 1 and firm 2 in stage 3 set outputs q1 and 
:
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q2 simultaneously to solve the following problems:
%5(35, 3:, M5) = #FG2#HIJ(!5 $ 35 $ M5)%5
%:(35, 3:, M5) = #FG2#HIC(!: $ 3: $ *+)%:
Anticipating the behavior as described by these quantity functions, the common supplier sets s1 and s2 and firm 
1’s upper division picks t1 in the following programs:
{35, 3:} = #FG2#HKJ,KC[(35 $ *,)%5(35, 3:, M5) + (3: $ *,)%:(35, 3:, M5)]
M5 = #FG2#HNJ(M5 $ *+)%5(35, 3:, M5)
Solving jointly, we obtain the equilibrium supplier prices and transfer price. Substituting the solution values 
back into the quantity functions yields the following equilibrium results in subgame DC:
Lemma 12. In the equilibrium of subgame DC,
1) supplier prices are
3589 =
(@7;)(<'=?)7(B';)=>
5: , 3:
89 = <'=?7=>: ;
2) transfer price in firm 1, retail prices and quantities are
M589 =
(:';)(<'=>)7(@7;)=?
E ,
!589 =
A:W7E;';CD<7(@7E;7;C)(=>7=?)
5:(:7;) , !:
89 =
(5B7R;)<7(E7P;)(=>7=?)
5:(:7;) ;
%589 = <'=>'=?O(:7;) , %:
89 =
(E7;)(<'=>'=?)
5:(:7;) ;
3) firm profits are
L589 = A!589 $ 3589 $ *+D%589 = (E';
C)(<'=>'=?)C
5B(:7;)C , 
L:89 = A!:89 $ 3:89 $ *+D%:89 = (E7;)
C(<'=>'=?)C
5@@(:7;)C  . 
Subgame with firm 1 centralized and firm 2 decentralized (CD)
Results for subgame CD are immediately obtainable from Lemma 3C by switching the positions 
:
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between the two firms. 
Lemma 13. In the equilibrium of subgame CD,
1) supplier prices are
3598 = <'=?7=>: , 3:
98 =
(@7;)(<'=?)7(B';)=>
5: ;
2) transfer price in firm 2, retail prices and quantities are
M:98 =
(:';)(<'=>)7(@7;)=?
E ,
!598 =
(5B7R;)<7(E7P;)(=>7=?)
5:(:7;) , !:
98 =
A:W7E;';CD<7(@7E;7;C)(=>7=?)
5:(:7;) ,
%598 =
(E7;)(<'=>'=?)
5:(:7;) , %:
98 = <'=>'=?O(:7;) .
3) firm profits are
L598 = A!598 $ 3598 $ *+D%598 = (E7;)
C(<'=>'=?)C
5@@(:7;)C  , 
L:98 = A!:98 $ 3:98 $ *+D%:98 = (E';
C)(<'=>'=?)C
5B(:7;)C . 
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Appendix B: Bertrand Competition
In this appendix, we examine the base model studied in section 2 under Bertrand price competition.
The three-stage game is similar to the one in the base model. In stage 1, firms choose simultaneously between 
centralization and decentralization. In stage 2, supplier prices and transfer prices (for a decentralized firm) are 
chosen. In stage 3, retail prices are chosen (by the centralized firm or by the lower division for a decentralized 
firm). From the inverse demand functions introduced in section 2, we can readily derive the following (direct) 
demand equations:
%5 = <57; $
5
5';C !5 +
;
5';C !:,
%: = <57; $
5
5';C !: +
;
5';C !5.
The following lemmas present results parallel to Lemmas 1-4 in the text. They correspond to the four 
subgames (CC, DD, DC, CD) following stage 1 of the three-stage game. The key difference between the 
results reported here and those of Lemmas 1-4 in the text lies in that here the firms engage in Bertrand price 
competition in the last stage of the game.
In subgame CC, the two exclusive external suppliers first simultaneously set their supplier prices s1
and s2, respectively. Given the supplier prices, the two firms then simultaneously choose their retail prices p1
and p2, respectively, to maximize their individual profit as follows:
!5(35, 35) = #FG2#HhJ(!5 $ 35 $ *+)%5
!:(35, 35) = #FG2#HhC(!: $ 3: $ *+)%:
Solving these problems jointly, we obtain the firms’ retail prices given the supplier prices. Denote their outputs 
as %5(35, 35) and %:(35, 35).
In stage 2 of the game, the two exclusive suppliers decide the supplier prices to maximize their 
individual profits and solve:
35 = #FG2#HKJ(35 $ *,)%5(35, 3:)
3: = #FG2#HKC(3: $ *,)%:(35, 3:)
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The solution to these problems yields the equilibrium supplier prices by the outside suppliers. From these 
equilibrium values and the solutions above we can derive all other equilibrium values as summarized in the 
following lemma.
Lemma 1B. In the equilibrium of subgame CC,
1) supplier prices are
3599 = 3:99 =
(5';)(:7;)(<'=?)7(:';C)=>
@';':;C ;
2) retail prices and quantities are
!599 = !:99 =
:A5';)(O';CD<7A:';CD(=>7=?)
(:';)(@';':;C) ,
%599 = %:99 = (:';
C)(<'=>'=?)
(57;)(:';)(@';':;C);
3) firm profits are
L599 = A!599 $ 3599 $ *+D%599 = (5';)(:';
C)C(<'=>'=?)C
(57;)(:';)C(@';':;C)C ,
L:99 = A!:99 $ 3:99 $ *+D%:99 = (5';)(:';
C)C(<'=>'=?)C
(57;)(:';)C(@';':;C)C .
Similar procedures as those in section 2 are followed in obtaining the next three lemmas for the other 
three subgames.
Lemma 2B. In the equilibrium of subgame DD,
1) supplier prices are
3588 = 3:88 =
(5';)(:7;)(<'=?)7(@';':;C)=>
E':;'O;C ;
2) transfer prices, retail prices and quantities are
M588 = M:88 =
(5';)(:7;)(<'=>)7(@';':;C)=?
E':;'O;C ,
!588 = !:88 = A
5';)(5W'O;CD<7A:';CD(=>7=?)
(:';)(E':;'O;C) ,
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%588 = %:88 = (:';
C)(<'=>'=?)
(57;)(:';)(E':;'O;C);
3) firm profits are
L588 = (!588 $ 3588 $ *+)%588 = :
(5';)(:';C)(O';C)(<'=>'=?)C
(57;)(:';)C(E':;'O;C)C ,
L:88 = (!:88 $ 3:88 $ *+)%:88 = :
(5';)(:';C)(O';C)(<'=>'=?)C
(57;)(:';)C(E':;'O;C)C .
Lemma 3B. In the equilibrium of subgame DC,
1) supplier prices are
3589 =
A5';)(:7;)(@7;':;CD(<'=?)7(5E7:;'5R;C';S7@;i)=>
:(O';C)(@'O;C) ,
3:89 =
A5';)(:7;)(E7:;'O;CD(<'=?)7A:';CD(E7;'O;C)=>
:(O';C)(@'O;C) ;
2) transfer price in firm 1, retail prices and quantities are
M589 =
A5';)(:7;)(@7;':;CD(<'=>)7(5E7:;'5R;C';S7@;i)=?
:(O';C)(@'O;C) ,
!589 =
A5';)A@7;':;CD(5W'O;CD<7A:';CD(@7O;'O;C)(=>7=?)
:(:';)(O';C)(@'O;C) , !:
89 =
A5';)(E7:;'O;CD<7A:';CD(=>7=?)
(:';)(@'O;C) ,
%589 =
A:';CD(@7;':;C)(<'=>'=?)
:(57;)(:';)(O';C)(@'O;C) , %:
89 =
A:';CD(E7:;'O;C)(<'=>'=?)
:(57;)(:';)(O';C)(@'O;C) ;
3) firm profits are
L589 = A!589 $ 3589 $ *+D%589 =
(5';)A:';CD(@7;':;C)C(<'=>'=?)C
:(57;)(:';)C(O';C)(@'O;C)C , 
L:89 = A!:89 $ 3:89 $ *+D%:89 =
(5';)A:';CDC(E7:;'O;C)C(<'=>'=?)C
@(57;)(:';)C(O';C)(@'O;C)C . 
Lemma 4B. In the equilibrium of subgame CD,
1) supplier prices are
3598 =
A5';)(:7;)(E7:;'O;CD(<'=?)7A:';CD(E7;'O;C)=>
:(O';C)(@'O;C) ,
3:98 =
A5';)(:7;)(@7;':;CD(<'=?)7(5E7:;'5R;C';S7@;i)=>
:(O';C)(@'O;C) ;
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2) transfer price in firm 2, retail prices and quantities are
M:98 =
A5';)(:7;)(@7;':;CD(<'=>)7(5E7:;'5R;C';S7@;i)=?
:(O';C)(@'O;C) ,
!598 =
A5';)(E7:;'O;CD<7A:';CD(=>7=?)
(:';)(@'O;C) , !:
98 =
A5';)A@7;':;CD(5W'O;CD<7A:';CD(@7O;'O;C)(=>7=?)
:(:';)(O';C)(@'O;C) ,
%598 =
A:';CD(E7:;'O;C)(<'=>'=?)
:(57;)(:';)(O';C)(@'O;C) , %:
98 =
A:';CD(@7;':;C)(<'=>'=?)
:(57;)(:';)(O';C)(@'O;C) ;
3) firm profits are
L598 = A!598 $ 3598 $ *+D%598 =
(5';)A:';CDC(E7:;'O;C)C(<'=>'=?)C
@(57;)(:';)C(O';C)(@'O;C)C , 
L:98 = A!:98 $ 3:98 $ *+D%:98 =
(5';)A:';CD(@7;':;C)C(<'=>'=?)C
:(57;)(:';)C(O';C)(@'O;C)C . 
These lemmas lend support to similar conclusions to those we made in the text following Lemmas 1-4. 
In turn we have the following proposition that parallels the results in Proposition 1. It confirms that price
competition in the product market yields similar results as in the base model with quantity competition.
Proposition 1B. The following results hold in equilibrium when the two firms have exclusive external 
suppliers and engage in Bertrand price competition.
(1) Decentralization is the dominant strategy for both firms for all & ) [0,1].
(2) The game is an efficient dominant-strategy game.
Proof: In stage one, each firm chooses between centralization (C) and decentralization (D). The reduced game 
for stage 1 of the 3-stage game is represented by the following matrix:
     Firm 2
 C D 
C (L599, L:99) (L598, L:98) 
D (L589, L:89) (L588, L:88) 
Firm 1
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Using results in Lemmas 1B-4B,
L589 $ L599 = (5';)(:';
C)(E@'XE;C7OR;i7:;j':;k)(<'=>'=?)C
:(57;)(:';)C(O';C)(@'O;C)C(@';':;C)C > 0,
L588 $ L598 = (5';)(:';
C)(BE@'5PB@;C7XW@;i'55:;j'@:;k7X;Je)(<'=>'=?)C
@(57;)(:';)C(O';C)(@'O;C)C(E':;'O;C)C > 0.
Hence, firm 1 has a dominant strategy in D. By symmetry, firm 2 also has a dominant strategy in D. Thus, the 
unique Nash equilibrium of the above matrix game is (D, D). Since, by Lemmas 1B and 2B,
L588 $ L599 = L:88 $ L:99 =
(5';)(:7;)(:';C)(5:'E;'B;C7:;i7;l)(<'=>'=?)C
@(57;)(:';)C(O';C)(@'O;C)C(E':;'O;C)C > 0,
the game is one with an efficient dominant-strategy equilibrium.
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